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Introduction 
This paper is presented as a collective contribution of members of the multidisciplinary project Digital Age: 
New Problems for the Law, funded by the Generalitat Valenciana, which aims at analysing and discussing some 
crucial impacts that communication and information technologies are having on our legal systems. Our 
present proposal revolves around the content and reach of a conception of privacy interpreted in an 
informational sense. The controversial separation of the public and private spheres is particularly troubling 
nowadays given the current capacity of governments and enterprises to collect and use personal information. 
Starting with a conceptual approach to the meaning and value of privacy where the cluster of moral 
pretensions and reasons implied can be a guide to legislative and judicial decisions, the paper goes on to deal 
with three problems that have been considered worthy of particular attention. First, the recording of 
communications of customers that financial institutions will accomplish in accordance with the European 
regulation on market abuse raises particular concern about their impact on privacy. Secondly, the use of video 
surveillance evidence has been considered by our constitutional jurisprudence specially protected by 
informational self-determination. But this interpretation can generate an interesting debate about different 
standards of evidence in social and criminal jurisdictions. Finally, the intrinsic vocation to internationalisation 
of information flows requires an international legal perspective from which to consider the new European legal 
regime as well as to reflect on disputes resolution and applicable law. 
1. Privacy in Information Technology: Concept and Foundations for Regulation.  
A free society favours the diffusion of information as a solid basis for a free and committed citizenship and the 
control of governmental and market institutions. However, information irresponsibly wielded can become a 
hazardous instrument that undermines foundational values of a society. In the Internet era, the growth and 
possibilities of processing data imply a particularly severe risk for privacy. At first sight, it is so because it 
becomes more difficult to preserve a reserved sphere where to build and develop our personality outside the 
eyes of others. Yet it is not simply a negative matter of personal privacy or intimacy. It is also an issue of an 
increased informational power of private and public institutions at the expense of individuals. Defining privacy 
in a broad sense as a guarantee of non-domination requires, first, stating the relation of the concept with 
intimacy and, then, exposing its broader implications with other values in the context of information 
technologies. Here privacy appeals to values beyond intimacy since “the emergence of Big Data creates clear 
winners and losers”1. 
Intimacy and privacy are interrelated concepts. However, and against linguistic common uses2, it is necessary 
to draw a conceptual distinction between the intimate and the private, according to Garzón Valdés3 or Castilla 
el Pino’s4 proposals. Some important normative issues underlying the debate about the risks of information 
technologies are better enlightened if we separate the inner sphere where the most profound individual 
                                                        
1 Strahilevitz, Lior Jacob (2010). “Toward a positive theory of privacy law”, Harvard Law Review, vol. 126, pp. 2010-
2042, at 2021. 
2 Toscano, Manuel (2017), “Sobre el concepto de privacidad: la relación entre privacidad e intimidad”, Isegoría. Revista 
de Filosofía Moral y Política, nº 57, pp. 533-552, at 544. 
3 Garzón Valdés, Ernesto (2003), “Lo íntimo, lo privado y lo público”, Claves de Razón Práctica, nº 137, pp. 14-24. 
4 Castilla del Pino, Carlos (1989), “Público, privado, íntimo”, en Castilla del Pino (ed.), De la intimidad. Barcelona: 
Crítica, pp. 25-31. 
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identity and autonomy are formed from the shared experiences of privacy, not always founded in our desire to 
partake this inner life in a caring context. 
The origin of the idea of intimacy lies in the liberal defence of autonomy and the need for a realm reserved for 
the full realization of individuals5. As Garzón Valdés stated, the intimate is "the sphere of each person's 
thoughts, of the formation of decisions, of doubts that escape a clear formulation, of what is repressed, of 
what has not yet been expressed and perhaps never will be, not only because the individual does not want to 
express it but because it cannot be expressed”6. The sphere of intimacy is the last redoubt of the individual’s 
personality, in which the individual fully exercises her sovereignty and decides her social, private and public, 
behaviour. Therefore, any intervention in a person’s intimacy affects her autonomy and her dignity as a human 
being. Our inner lives should be developed under the protection of public exposition that would inhibit the 
free operation of personal feeling, fantasy, imagination, and thought7. Individuality is realized through 
experimental self-discovery, which requires space free from evaluation and risk8. The more our inner lives are 
being exposed, the more we are tempted to act in compliance with collective norms and we are subjected to 
approval of others9. 
Intimacy is irradiated in those private areas that are reserved for a kind of interpersonal relationships where 
the individual’s desires and preferences prevail and do not allow for general accessibility. Privacy is the domain 
of personal freedom, in which individuals try to assert their wishes and preferences. The veil that protects 
individuals from public gaze is partially lifted at the discretion of each individual to admit certain others. This 
sphere also plays an important part in the articulation of an inner life in as much as “it permits one to explore 
unpublic feelings in something other than solitude, and to learn about the comparable feelings of one’s 
intimates, including to a degree their feelings toward oneself”10. Privacy in this sense can be understood as 
shared intimacy. And it is privacy, and not intimacy, that has legal relevance: it is only when intimacy impinges 
on relationships with others that it becomes a legal issue11. 
Having control over what we expose privately or publicly is what allows us to adapt ourselves to a world of 
social relationships in which we expose our desires or materialize our preferences according to how they fit 
our social environment. An individual is much more than what could be integrated into social spaces. The 
value of privacy lies in the possibility it affords to share our inner experience only with those we choose and, in 
the degree, that it is appropriate for us to share in a particular relationship12. Intimate details can be disclosed 
for specific purposes in relationships that are far from being thought as intimate, such as medical, financial or 
legal. What constitutes intimate relationships is not the sharing of personal information, but the context of 
caring which makes the sharing of personal information relevant. It is in the context of a reciprocal desire to 
share present and future intense and important experiences that the revealing of personal information takes 
on special significance13. So, what is properly called private is not some kind of event or setting but the kind of 
relationship in which acts or sharing of information occur. In this sense, a certain place is not private or public 
in itself. The scope of privacy depends on the different type of interpersonal relationship or context that can 
generate a reasonable expectation of privacy. And that means the expectation of non-intrusion or, at least, of 
                                                        
5 Béjar, Helena (1988), El ámbito íntimo. Privacidad, individualismo y modernidad. Madrid: Alianza. 
6 Garzón Valdés, E., “Lo íntimo, lo privado y lo público”, cit., p. 16. 
7 Nagel, Thomas (1998), “Concealment and Exposure”, Philosophy & Public Affairs", vol. 27 nº 1, pp 3-30, at 4-5. 
8 Magi, Trina J. (2011). “Fourteen Reasons Privacy Matters: A Multidisciplinary Review of Scholarly Literature”, The 
Library Quarterly, vol. 81, nº 2, pp. 187-209, at 195. 
9  Nagel, T., “Concealment and Exposure”, cit., p. 20; Reiman, Jeffrey (1995), “Driving to the Panopticon: A 
Philosophical Exploration of the Risks to Privacy Posed by the Highway Technology of the Future”, Santa Clara 
Computer & High Technology Law Journal, vol. 11, pp. 27-44, at 41. 
10 Nagel, T., “Concealment and Exposure”, cit., p. 20. 
11 Pérez Luño, Antonio (2012), Los derechos humanos en la sociedad tecnológica, Madrid: Editorial Universitas, p. 92. 
12 Rachels, James (1975). “Why Privacy is Important?”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 4, nº 4, pp. 323-333, at 328. 
13 Reiman, Jeffrey (1976), “Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 6, nº 1, pp. 26-44, at 
33-34 
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notification and request of consent to obtain information and its restriction for specific purposes, as we see 
below in the case of the use of video surveillance for the control of work activity. 
From this point of view, intimacy and privacy are part of a continuum. Firstly, it is in the intimate domain where 
individuals develop their desires, opinions and thoughts that will be translated into diverse relationships with 
others in the private sphere. The right to intimacy refers to the power that every individual has to control the 
access and reach of others to that intimate domain. The right to privacy refers to legitimated restrictions on 
the accessibility and dissemination of what has been expressed in the context of particular relationships. 
Secondly, if intimacy is necessary for our autonomy and free development of our personality, privacy provides 
the space to develop a variety of acts and relationships and to exchange personal information that allows us 
to explore new facets of our own. Privacy is especially closer to intimacy when private relationships are 
oriented to express emotions or feelings of love, liking or care14. The protection of privacy is then justified in 
the same reasons that justify the protection of intimacy. 
But the province of privacy is broader than that of intimate relationships. In a contextual sense, the concept 
refers broadly to a plurality of areas or contexts preserved from the public gaze and in which different norms 
governing roles, expectations, actions and practices operate15. The same meaning of control over accessibility 
to the information disseminated in particular contexts is central to the right of privacy in this broader sense. 
But its underlying rationale is not just intimacy. The right to data protection is based on the value of privacy as 
distinct from intimacy. The difference is relevant in cases such as those related to video recordings at work 
discussed later. While the right to intimacy has a more negative content of exclusion, the right to data 
protection is conceived in the sense of informational self-determination; that is, as a positive freedom to 
exercise control over the data and information related to a person that have already left the sphere of intimacy 
to become information shared in particular relationships. Both rights can be considered independent for 
various reasons: 
1. The right to data protection refers specifically to personal information that can be collected, analysed, 
processed and disseminated or made accessible to third parties. 
2. The rationale under the protection of personal data is not always their intimate nature. There can be other 
important reasons for such a protection, being especially relevant those that appeal to security, equality and 
justice16. Data protection tries to avoid information-based harms. The fact that personal information is used to 
inflict harm does not make it primarily a privacy issue but one of security. Protection is also oriented to 
eliminate information inequality: people value the opportunities, facilities, discounts, and knowledge provided 
by information technologies in exchange for the use of their personal data. But this willingness to share 
personal data in exchange for benefits does not take place in a fair and transparent context, in which everyone 
knows the conditions and results of their decisions and there is an equal opportunity for all. Therefore, data 
protection should be put in place to guarantee fair and equitable market conditions, appealing to 
transparency, participation and notification in order to constitute fair contracts. And, finally, uncontrolled use 
of data generates information injustice. Protection should aim at avoiding transfers of information beyond the 
context and the purposes for which it was collected. What is to be controlled is the dominant position that 
possession and uses of data can secure in spheres and for purposes different from the ones they were 
collected for, particularly in case of secondary uses that may not have even been conceived when it was 
collected17. 
                                                        
14 Innes, Julie (1992), Privacy, Intimacy and Isolation. New York: Oxford University Press. 
15 Nissenbaum, Helen (2004). “Privacy as Contextual Integrity”, Washington Law Review, 79 (1), pp. 101-139 
16 Hoven, Jeroen van den (2004). “Privacy and the Varieties of Informational Wrongdoing”, en Richard A. Spinello & 
Herman T. Tavani (eds.),  Readings in Cyber Ethics, Jones & Bartlett Publishers, 2ª edn., pp. 489-500, at 491 ff. 
17 Mayer-Schönberger, Viktor and Cukier, Kenneth (2013), Big Data. A Revolution that Will Transform How we Live, 
Work, and Think. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, p. 153. 
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3. The ability to capture and keep a huge amount of diverse information has altered the nature of the 
problem. Big data worries not just because it contains personal information, but also because of the 
consequences of analysing and correlating data through new technologies. The incomparable increase in the 
ability to disseminate and provide access to information; the advances in storage, aggregation, analysis, and 
mining of information; or the enhanced modes of gathering or capturing information from automated devices, 
service providers and metadata require public intervention. The risks I have referred to so far -insecurity, 
inequality, secondary uses, decontextualization, scale and aggregation- produce an entirely new menace: they 
increase the power that a few can have over individuals. The compilation of individual’s data is being used to 
make important decisions about her18. An immense power is held by those who have the control over the 
collection and processing of data. This is so especially when it is exercised in a non-transparent manner, there 
is no real competition between the agents that have the capacity to execute those activities, and the subjects 
are unaware or do not participate in the determination of purposes. Control over financial information 
discussed later is an interesting case where some of these problems emerge. Using the metaphor of the 
panopticon, Reiman highlighted that privacy is affected “from the way our publicly observable activities are 
dispersed over space and time” and the way its collection is gathering up “the pieces of our public lives and 
making them visible from a single point”19. 
The human being becomes a mere object of information instead of a subject of rights20. Particularly, when 
people are classified into categories on the basis of their estimated value or worth and their susceptibility to 
various appeals21. This categorization leads to important injustices. In the first place, it produces losses of 
opportunities. An individual can be deprived of access to certain goods or services that do not fit the profile 
that has been attributed to him. Secondly, it generates inequalities. As Lyon states, “the software codes that 
classify us are designed to distinguish between one group and another to enable people to be treated 
differently depending on the category into which they fall”. Classification and profiling processes favour “the 
formation of social stereotypes” determining the “attribution of privileges and rights and social exclusion”22. 
Thirdly, it is based on oversimplification, that is, categorization reduces individual diversity to collective models 
of behaviour. And, finally, it involves loss of autonomy. “Obedience to standards”, wrote Bauman, “tends to be 
achieved nowadays through enticement and seduction rather than by coercion - and it appears in the disguise 
of the exercise of free will, rather than revealing itself as an external force”23. 
Therefore, the problem of privacy in information technologies is a wider problem than the violation of 
intimacy. Flow and overuse of personal information is a social reality that individuals cannot restrict by 
themselves and that affects shared moral values, such as security, equality or inclusion. As such, it is 
insufficient to consider that the role of legislation is to give individuals the means (notice, access, consent, 
correction) by which they can act to protect their privacy and to set responsibilities to organizations in 
collecting and using personal information. This approach aims at providing people with control over their 
personal data, allowing them to decide how to weigh the costs and benefits of collecting and using their 
information. Underlying some of the difficulties of this “privacy self-management” framework24 is the lack of 
consideration of privacy as a common good that should be enhanced collectively25. Being an indispensable 
condition for a just order, public regulation of privacy should help to move people away from irrationality or 
indifference when providing personal information and protect the most vulnerable. Government’s constraint 
                                                        
18 Solove, Daniel (2004). The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Information Age, New York: New York 
University Press. 
19 Reiman, J., “Driving to the Panopticon”, cit., p. 29. 
20  Garriga, Ana (2018), “La elaboración de perfiles y su impacto en los derechos fundamentales. Una primera 
aproximación a su regulación en el Reglamento General de Protección de Datos de la Unión Europea”, Derechos y 
libertades, nº 38, pp. 107-139, at 138. 
21 Gandy, Oscar (1993). The Panoptic Sort: A Political Economy of Personal Information. Boulder, CO: Westview. 
22 Lyon, David (2007), Surveillance Studies. An Overview, Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 184-185. 
23 Bauman, Zygmunt (2000), Liquid Modernity, Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 86. 
24 Solove,  (2013). “Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma”, Harvard Law Review, 126, pp. 1880-1903. 
25 Regan, Priscilla (2002). “Privacy as a Common Good in the Digital World”, Information, Communication & Society, 
vol. 5, nº 3, pp.382-405, at 395. 
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of individual choice is legitimate to prevent or preserve foundational goods as privacy26. And, as we shall see 
below, this justified intervention must be nowadays necessarily supranational or global. 
Certainly, impeding information flows can have significant economic and social costs. Like any other value, 
privacy must be weighed with other values when it is regulated. This is the case, for instance, of the problems 
that arise from the control of financial information, which highlights the conflict between privacy and 
prevention of market abuse; or the conflict between worker’s privacy and employer’s interests. When conflict 
occurs, intimacy provides an ultimate reason as a requirement of human dignity and autonomy strong enough 
to defeat other moral claims. This explains that those data that affect the "most intimate redoubt of 
personality" (beliefs, ideology, ethnic or racial origin, sexuality, health, death, family relationships, genetic data) 
usually require special guarantees in our legal systems. It is a controversial issue which personal data meet a 
sufficient degree of intimacy or sensitivity to require more guarantees. Data is usually categorized as sensitive 
according to material social standards that consider their special incidence in matters that individuals may 
wish reasonably to withhold. But we can doubt if certain personal matters are intrinsically sensitive or it 
depends on the claim by the individual (norm-dependent or norm-invoking)27. In any case, it is not usually 
interpreted in a subjective sense. It may refer both to the quality of the information or to the reasonable 
expectations of the individual, in the objective sense that most people in a given society choose not to reveal. 
In other cases, a protective criterion is used according to which those data whose dissemination entails a 
greater risk of domination, discriminatory practices or depiction of the individual in an unfavourable light are 
sensitive. 
2. Privacy and Financial Information within the Scope of the Criminal Process28 
2.1. Introduction 
Although the use of video recordings as a source of evidence has been subject to questioning in the fields of 
labour and criminal law, due to the especially invasive nature of the recording of the subject's personal 
activity, in an area that is as different in scope as is the financial field, we are now witnessing the creation of a 
new kind of financial reporting – involving telephone communications, electronic communications and video 
conferencing – of all the transactions that take place daily in institutions, with the purpose of combating 
market manipulation through the use of insider information. Regulation (EU) No. 596/2014 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on market abuse is intended to preserve the integrity of the 
internal market by prosecuting the carrying out of transactions using insider information, illegal 
communication of such information and market manipulation. As a complement to, and effective guarantee of 
its enforcement, Directive 2014/57/EU of 16 April 2014 provides for criminal sanctions to punish market abuse 
behaviours, in the face of the evident inadequacy of administrative sanctions. 
The basic premise of Regulation (EU) No. 596/2014 is that market abuse is the main obstacle to economic 
growth and market wealth. From there, the above-mentioned regulation defines those behaviours that are 
condemned, not only by specifying the situations that constitute infringements and those that do not, but also 
illustrating with examples the behaviours that the State intends to prosecute and punish. 
The above descriptive effort is not sufficient to ensure the integrity of the market; it is necessary to provide the 
authorities of each State with effective powers, instruments and resources to enable detection and 
demonstrate the infringement in order to punish it. With this goal in mind, measures are articulated, such as 
access to the premises of natural and legal persons for the purpose of seizing documents, whenever there is 
reasonable suspicion of the existence of documents and data related to an investigation into insider dealing or 
                                                        
26 Allen, Anita (2011). Unpopular privacy: What must we hide?. Nueva York: Oxford University Press. 
27 Wacks, Raymond (2010). “Should the Concept of Privacy be Abandoned?”, Law, Morality, and the Private Domain. 
Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, pp. 235-248. 
28 This paper is part of the research project "The Digital Era: New Problems for the Law" (AICO/2107/161) funded by 
the Generalitat Valenciana's Conselleria d'Educació, Cultura i Esport. 
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market manipulation. Depending on the laws of each State, such access may require the prior authorization of 
the judicial authority of the Member State concerned. In addition to entry into the premises, there is another 
instrument that will serve in the investigation: access to the data traffic and recordings of telephone 
conversations held to make purchases, and to discover and corroborate the existence of transactions involving 
insider dealing. 
As recognized by Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 itself, data traffic and telephone conversations constitute 
decisive evidence and, in some cases, the only evidence that can prove insider dealing and market 
manipulation, and that is why these must be recorded and stored by the institutions for some years. Although 
this evidence may be key to detecting an infringement, it will mean accessing information of quite different 
types, since it will entail recording, managing and storing all communication related to the purchase and sale 
of any financial product, whether they be swaps, bonds, derivatives or shares, between all those people who in 
some way or another have contributed to closing the transaction. This means that not only will 
communications between the client and the employee who is responsible for marketing the product be 
recorded, but any and all previous and internal communications directed towards concluding the transaction – 
even if it ultimately fails to materialise – will also be stored29. For illustrative purposes, these include all those 
the trader holds with the sales distribution desk, either to close or negotiate the final selling price, determine 
details of the transaction or set the due date, the interest rate or the price of the transaction. All 
communications aimed at closing a transaction and all their contents are subject to being recorded, without 
discrimination, so it may be that a recorded conversation includes not only financial information, but also 
personal or family issues related to the client or the institution's employees. 
According to this system of recording and storage – which must be durable and safe – all conversations and 
all electronic correspondence between the client and the institution – aimed at closing a transaction or service 
– shall be stored in such a way that it allows the transaction to be reconstructed from its beginning to its 
conclusion in a short period of time. 
The objective of this system is to quickly detect transactions involving market abuse, initiate the relevant 
investigation and locate evidence to enable the punishment of the employee, the client or the corresponding 
institution. 
2.2. Recording of telephone communications and access to documentation. Regulatory Framework 
As already stated, in order to detect and punish the carrying out of transactions involving insider dealing, 
illegal communication of such information and market manipulation, the records made by the investment 
services company, credit institution or financial institution of the data traffic and telephone conversations 
between its employees and its clients constitute an essential piece of evidence. 
Thanks to this information, the competent authority will be able to identify the person responsible for 
disseminating false or misleading information, the contact maintained for a period of time or the relationship 
between them. 
The scale of the information available to each banking institution and which will be made available to the 
administrative authority, is explained in Recital 65 of Regulation (EU) No. 596/2014 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on market abuse, and in particular is found in art. 23, which details the 
functions and the powers exercised by the competent authorities, in accordance with national legislation, in 
the field of oversight and investigation. These powers include accessing any document and data regardless of 
its format and requesting existing recordings of telephone conversations, electronic communications and data 
                                                        
29 European Securities and Markets Authority, Questions and Answers, On the MiFID II and MiFIR investor protection 
and intermediaries topics, p. 38. Accessible at 
https://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files_force/library/esma3543349_mifid_ii_qas_on_investor_protection_topics.pdf 
June 2018 (8). 
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traffic records kept by the investment services companies, credit institutions or financial institutions. They may 
also require, to the extent permitted by national legislation, existing records on data traffic held by a 
telecommunications company when it is reasonably suspected that an offence has been committed, and these 
records may be relevant to the investigation of transactions or recommendations using insider information. In 
the case of Spain, currently the data traffic will be provided by communications operators or service providers 
as long as it is related to the investigation of an offence, there is sufficient evidence, and a judicial resolution 
has been taken in this regard30, as provided for in art. 588 ter j) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
For its part, Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, which establishes a 
framework for a regulatory regime for financial markets in the European Union, recognizes the power of the 
competent authority to require investment services companies to hand over their records of phone 
conversations, electronic communications or data traffic held by an investment services company or a credit 
institution, with the aim of detecting and punishing the practices of market abuse or the failure to comply with 
the requirements laid down in the Directive, provided there is a reasonable suspicion that such records, 
relating to the subject matter of the inspection or investigation, may be relevant to demonstrate market abuse 
behaviours. 
The same Directive, when it lists the requirements that must be fulfilled by investment services companies, 
requires a record of all the services, activities or transactions that are performed, which includes the recordings 
of telephone conversations or electronic communications relating to transactions on their own account and at 
the order of clients. The communication which will be recorded, stored, monitored and possibly used in a 
criminal process, shall be both telephone and electronic, and this category includes video conferencing, fax, 
email, Bloomberg mail, SMS, chat, instant messaging and mobile applications31. 
As a preliminary step to this measure, clients of the company, both new and old, will have to be notified that 
communications and telephone conversations will be recorded, and if such a notification has not been 
previously given, the investment services company (art. 17) shall not provide services by telephone, nor carry 
out investment activities with that client. 
Obviously, the client can communicate their orders using another channel other than electronic 
communication or telephone, but in that case, it should be recorded in a long-lasting medium and, in the case 
of transactions negotiated in conversations, the record will consist of minutes and notes. In this case, 
information will be logged about the date and time of the meetings, the place, the identity of attendees, 
promoters of the meeting and information about the order. 
And among the precautions to be taken, it must be shown that the company took "reasonable steps" to 
prevent their employees from carrying out, sending or receiving phone calls or electronic communications 
through private devices that the company cannot record or copy. 
The records shall be made available to clients and shall be kept for a period of five years, except where the 
competent authority requests that they be kept for a period of up to seven years. According to Delegated 
Regulation (EU) 2017/565, they have the right to request a copy of the recording during the term of 5 years. 
This record of electronic communications and data traffic that financial entities have implemented is described 
with detail in Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565 of 25 April 2016, which in art. 76 outlines the 
                                                        
30 MARCHENA GÓMEZ, M., La Reforma de la Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal en 2015 (The Reform of the Criminal 
Procedure Act in 2015), Castillo de Luna Ediciones Jurídicas, Madrid, 2015, p. 288. 
31 European Securities and Markets Authority, Questions and Answers, On the MiFID II and MiFIR investor protection 
and intermediaries topics, p. 41. Accessible at 
https://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files_force/library/esma3543349_mifid_ii_qas_on_investor_protection_topics.pdf (8 
June 2018). 
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"recording of telephone conversations and electronic communications policy" that investment services 
companies have to comply with. 
According to this article, the recording policy should be available in writing and its scope shall correspond to 
the institution, nature, scale and complexity of the institution's activity. In all cases, and irrespective of their 
number, such recordings will make it possible to identify the telephone conversations and electronic 
communications, on the one hand, and their content, on the other, provided that these are transactions 
carried out when trading on their own account and when providing services related to the reception, 
transmission and execution of client orders, even if those conversations or communications do not give rise to 
the conduct of such transactions or services (art. 16.7 Directive 65). 
With regard to its requirements, the recording policy must specify the procedures that guarantee that the 
company has implemented a system for those cases in which the recording is performed on devices provided 
by the company to an employee or hired person, and also, will determine the actions to be taken when 
performing communications or calls from personal devices which do not fall within the scope of recording (art. 
16.7 3rd and 8th paragraph, Directive 65). To this end, a record of people who have devices that are the 
property of the company or their own private property, whose use has been approved by the company, shall 
be maintained and regularly updated. 
However, that record of transactions and orders, including the communications, will not only serve to identify 
the transaction and those involved in case a violation of the market abuse rules is detected, it will also be 
continuously monitored by the investment service company with the aim of ensuring compliance with the 
recording requirements and the rest of the regulatory obligations provided for in Directive 2014/65/EU32. The 
criteria that will determine the frequency and purpose of monitoring, as an example but without limitation, 
may be the volume and frequency of transactions on their own account; the volume, frequency and 
characteristics of the orders from clients; the characteristics of clients; financial instruments and services 
offered and the conditions of the market accounts. 
2.3. Extension of the measure 
The recording of telephone and electronic communications, in the process of being implemented in financial 
institutions, is not only aimed at ensuring the integrity and transparency of the system, but also at ensuring, in 
the event of disciplinary procedures being opened for market abuse, that it has the virtue of constituting 
evidence, and this, however, raises questions about its procedural legitimacy. Firstly, due to the regulatory 
framework in which it is scheduled, it is not a framework decision that is binding on the target, but a Directive 
that sets out the objectives but whose effectiveness rests on the Member States of the EU and requires a law 
of transposition. 
Secondly, since it constitutes a measure with the power to impact on fundamental rights, such as the right to 
privacy (art. 18.1 EC), the right to the inviolability of communications (art. 18.3 EC) and the right to the 
protection of data (art. 18.4 EC), it requires clear and precise regulations on how to combat the risks of abuse 
or misuse of the data to be stored. 
Thirdly, it could be argued that the communication which will be subject to recording does not require the 
same degree of protection or safeguarding, due to its proprietary nature; however, although this is true, it is 
nevertheless a large database of personal and private data, subject to automated processing and with a high 
risk of irregular access. There are doubts as to whether this intervention, approached in such general terms 
                                                        
32 European Securities and Markets Authority, Questions and Answers, On the MiFID II and MiFIR investor protection 
and intermediaries topics, p. 39. Accessible at 
https://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files_force/library/esma3543349_mifid_ii_qas_on_investor_protection_topics.pdf (8 
June 2018). 
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because it records the entire conversation indiscriminately, is strictly necessary to achieve the intended 
purpose or if provision should be made for some sort of differentiation, limitation or exception. 
3. The Probative Value of Video Surveillance: Between the Right to Privacy and the Right to Data 
Protection. Its Different Treatment in Social and Criminal Jurisdiction33 
The use of video recordings as a source of evidence has been questioned on multiple occasions and, of 
course, rejected or disallowed, due to the obtaining of the recording being considering illegitimate when it 
was in violation of fundamental rights; to such an extent that, due to the particularly invasive nature of the 
capturing of the personal activity of the recorded subject, it is often frequently condemned. That is, precisely, 
the focus of the role played by art. 11.1 of Spain's Judiciary Act (LOPJ) when stipulating that evidence obtained 
in a way that directly or indirectly violates fundamental rights is not admissible. 
At the present time, one of the areas in which the use of these video recordings has played its largest role is in 
the field of employment law, with its use protected under the power to monitor granted to employers by art. 
20.3 ET (Workers’ Statute). In this particular context, the TC (Constitutional Court) has been delineating an 
interesting legal principle whereby the recording of the work activity of workers within the company is not 
seen as affecting, in general terms, their right to privacy, especially if the recording takes place in communal 
areas of the company exclusively intended for the carrying out of the worker's contractual obligations 
(compare cash registers at a supermarket as opposed to the greater controversies that arise with any 
recording in an office which, while being the property of the company is intended for private use34 or, of 
course the ban on its use in spaces such as toilets or changing rooms35). The TC also recognizes that, more 
than the right to privacy, these recordings affect the right to informational self-determination (or the right to 
data protection) expressed in art. 18.4 CE (Spanish Constitution) (Sentence of the Constitutional Court STC 
29/2013, 11 February). By extension, then – and as long as the recording of the image is the personal data of 
the worker (art. 3, Spanish Data Protection law, or LOPD; STC 173/2013, of 7 October) – the right of the worker 
to know (in other words to be informed) of the place and manner in which their data is collected, and the 
intended purpose to which the data will or may be put, is enshrined in the legislation (art. 5 LOPD)36. 
                                                        
33 This paper is part of the research project "The Digital Era: New Problems for the Law" (AICO/2107/161) funded by 
the Generalitat Valenciana's Conselleria d'Educació, Cultura i Esport. 
34 SSC 239/2014, of 1 April uses terminology imported from that used by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) 
to pronounce on the difference between recording in open spaces, such as those where cash registers are found, and 
recording in an office, based on the "reasonable expectation of privacy" stating that: "the recording cameras were 
installed in at least two different places. In one area was the cash register, where the money was taken. The substance of 
the judgement is that all workers or, at least, most of them, had access to this location (…). It cannot be claimed that 
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in a place of common access for the performance of the functions that each 
worker is assigned by the company within the employment relationship. In that case, the company's power to manage and 
its related powers, does not impinge on the right to privacy of the workers when placing recording cameras in public 
areas with widespread access in which the general working activity of the company is performed. This is not the case 
with the cameras that were installed in the office of the defendant. (…) In principle, a single office is a room allocated to 
a particular person, and consent is required before facilitating the visual or personal access of third parties to the same. 
Therefore, in general terms, it can be said that the holder of the same has a reasonable expectation of privacy within his 
or her office, which may be violated if recording cameras are installed without their knowledge." 
35 STS (Sentence of the Supreme Court) 620/1997, of 5 May. 
36 See STC of 3 March 2016, as well as the more restrictive interpretation, on the need to inform the worker, which is 
contained in the individual opinions. With regard to developments in doctrine and jurisprudence that have led to the view 
of recordings as attacking the right to the protection of personal data and not, strictly speaking, against the right to 
privacy; as well as on employment and administrative demands to ensure that the recording of the work activity for the 
purpose of monitoring by the employer is not considered an attack on the fundamental rights of the worker, see 
ARRABAL PLATERO, P., "La videovigilancia laboral como prueba en el proceso" (Labour Video Surveillance as 
Evidence in the Judicial Process) Revista General de Derecho Procesal, Iustel, September-October 2015, 
www.iustel.com. 
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On the basis of these previous positions, the TS (Supreme Court) and TC have laid down the fundamental 
criteria for permissible recordings arising from the installation of video cameras by the employer provided 
that: 1) it is either a case of ordinary monitoring or there is a prior suspicion of unlawful behaviour37; 2) the 
measure passes the test of proportionality (suitability, necessity, and proportionality in the narrow sense) and 
3) the workers are unequivocally informed and the express purpose of the recording for monitoring is stated38. 
It is interesting to note that the suspicion of illegality of the activity or alleged failure to comply with 
employment terms is not always necessary as a prerequisite for the validity of the recordings. Ordinary 
measures exist to monitor the work activity that the employer can deploy without having had any suspicion of 
non-compliance on the part of the worker (and which would enable the employer to install recording cameras 
provided that workers are expressly warned of this); and, together with these, there is also the possibility of 
extraordinary monitoring measures that, on suspicion of the commission of an illegal activity, would authorize 
the employer to install cameras and legitimise the use of the recordings, even without the corresponding 
arning to the worker39. From this perspective, one might understand that in the case of recordings made as 
part of ordinary monitoring activity, the capture of illegal activities performed by the worker that fall outside 
the purpose of the recording may not be used as a source of evidence substantiating any disciplinary action in 
the workplace. However, in my opinion, it will be necessary to introduce some nuance to this possible 
interpretation of the regulations in order to sustain a consistent application in the different areas of law. 
A direct consequence of the jurisprudential construction presented is the paradoxical situation in which the 
same recording could be admitted as evidence in employment proceedings, since there has been no breach of 
fundamental rights to obtain it, but nevertheless it will be inadmissible in criminal proceedings according to 
art. 11.1 LOPJ, since it does violate fundamental rights (or vice versa)40. 
This is the conclusion that could be drawn from an extrapolation of the arguments contained in the STC 
29/2013, of 11 February that overrides the disciplinary sanction imposed on a worker at the University of 
Seville who was in breach of his work schedule according to what could be verified from recordings obtained 
by a camera that he had not been warned had been installed and which had a different purpose (security) that 
was outside the area of the corporate monitoring of work activity. The question that can be raised in this case 
is what would have happened if, instead of the worker not complying with his work schedule, the recording 
                                                        
37 Regarding the suspicion of the employer in regard to the unlawful activity of the worker, two interesting rulings of the 
ECHR should be noted: the case of Köpke against Germany (ruling of inadmissibility) of 5 October 2010 and the 
judgement in López Ribalda and others v. Spain, from 9 January 2018. While in the ruling of inadmissibility in the 
Köpke case, suspicions were focused on only two workers and the recording lasted two weeks, in the conviction against 
Spain in the case of López Ribalda, suspicions were directed against all the staff and the recordings were kept for 
months. 
38 The ECHR has ruled on the extensive and exact information that must be provided to workers in the judgement 
Barbulescu v. Romania (Great Hall), of 5 September 2017 and, especially, against Spain in the Lopez Ribalda and others 
judgement, of 9 January 2018. In this judgement Spain was found guilty of the infringement of art. 8 of the ECHR after 
having accepted the dismissal of 5 supermarket workers for a number of thefts recorded by a video surveillance system, 
with some visible cameras and some hidden, but in relation to which they had only been informed of the visible cameras. 
39 In this sense, see FABREGAT MONFORT, G., "El control empresarial de los trabajadores a través de las nuevas 
tecnologías: algunas ideas clave" (Corporate Monitoring of Workers Using New Technologies: Some Key Ideas", 
Trabajo y Derecho, No. 5, May 2015. For the author "not having a clear idea of the aforementioned leads to confusion, 
because only from that perspective, from the purpose of the means used to monitor and the reason for its existence, and 
the differentiation between the measures taken as ordinary or extraordinary (i.e., to monitor someone), it is understood 
that neither the evidence obtained in the case prosecuted under the aforementioned STC 29/2013, of 11 February (LAW 
11227/2013), of the University of Seville, nor that of the case which is the subject of the also mentioned STS of 13 May 
2014, Rec. 1685/2013 (LAW 76886/2014) complies with the law, since in both cases the video camera, in theory, had 
been placed without the previous existence of indications or suspicions of a prior non-compliance". Op cit., p. 7. 
40 I had the opportunity to examine the different treatment that certain technological evidence is receiving in criminal and 
social cases in "The Probative Value of Emails", in Justicia penal y nuevas formas de delincuencia (Criminal Justice and 
New Forms of Crime) (ASENCIO MELLADO and FERNÁNDEZ LÓPEZ, Coords.), Tirant lo Blanch, Valencia, 2017, 
pp. 199-200. 
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had shown the commissioning of a criminal act (e.g., drug trafficking or theft of computer equipment)? Its 
foreseeable admission as evidence in criminal proceedings collides head-on – and is very difficult to justify – 
with its impossibility of use in employment proceedings. And giving a further turn to this argument, we would 
find that the recording that did not serve to impose a disciplinary action on the worker, would in fact serve to 
convict him for theft, and once convicted for theft from the company, his disciplinary dismissal would then be 
justified. This obliges the defendant to undertake long and costly procedural paths to reach, in the end, the 
initial starting point: the adoption of disciplinary measures from the evidence of the commissioning of a crime 
evidenced by a recording. 
A similar extrapolation could be made in the course of the facts referred to in the STS of 13 May 201441 that 
did not take video evidence into account to justify the dismissal of the cashier at a supermarket, recording the 
theft committed by not scanning the products that her boyfriend passed her, based on the reasoning that the 
camera had been installed for reasons of security against possible theft by third parties and not to monitor 
ordinary compliance with work activity. The possibility that this specific recording would not be taken into 
account for the purposes of a plausible criminal conviction in a prosecution for theft cannot, however, seem to 
be reasonably upheld. 
The enshrining of this different evidentiary treatment under criminal and employment law has become evident 
in several different and increasingly numerous judgements, as in the case of those of 26 September 2007; 8 
March 2011; 6 October 2011; or 16 June 2014, all of the TS; and the STC of 17 December 2012; of 7 October 
2013. 
It is therefore urgent to clarify the scope of the protection of fundamental rights and the role that art. 11.1 
LOPJ and the theory of prohibited evidence are called upon to play in proceedings. Or, put another way, 
whether the prohibition on the use in proceedings of evidence obtained through the violation of fundamental 
rights is intended to safeguard the essential purposes of the same (including the aim that the solution reached 
has not been achieved through the violation of fundamental rights), or to determine the extent and scope of 
indemnity for each specific fundamental right. 
The first of the options, in my view desirable, finds the reasoning for the exclusionary rule in the need to 
ensure behaviour in accordance with the law on the part of the agents of the state – the police – responsible 
for the criminal investigation42. In this way, the purpose of the exclusionary rule acquires a prophylactic or 
deterrent effect: it is absurd to obtain certain evidentiary information in violation of fundamental rights, since 
this cannot be used in legal proceedings. 
This origin connected to the need to ensure correct state action in criminal investigation, does not preclude 
the application of art. 11.1 LOPJ to evidence obtained illegally by individuals, although it is true that it 
influences its application by requiring, for it to be declared null and void, that the individual had obtained the 
evidence with the intention of providing it in the proceedings43. 
                                                        
41 Rec. 1685/2013. 
42 This reasoning for the exclusionary rule has been expressly and constantly defended by the US Supreme Court since 
1976 (Case Stone v. Powell). 
43 See STC 114/1984, of 29 November; 56/2003, of 29 March; or ATC (Decision of the TC) 115/2008, of 28 April. Also, 
along the same lines, VELASCO NUNEZ goes deeper when he claims that "We disagree with the Barcelona SAP (Court 
of Appeals) 20 October 2012 that decreed that the evidence was inadmissible when the complainant provided DVDs with 
pictures of non-consensual sexual abuse of her sister-in-law, since they had been stolen from the car of the alleged 
perpetrator where they had been concealed, alleging that this violated his right to privacy, "contaminating" the derived 
evidence. What is essential between individuals is the good or bad faith of whoever provides the evidence since, rather 
than considering an illegal and prohibited object – such as an illegal film – as property, and since in cases such as this the 
motives of profit and rem sibi habendi are excluded, it should be considered that its contribution to a criminal 
proceedings – through the police or directly to the Judge – is more constitutive of an act of a citizen who is collaborating 
and reporting, especially if the offence is serious, than an arbitrary act at the hands of the justice system, because in the 
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It is my understanding that, if this interpretive approach were to be applied to the evidence provided by an 
employer who, within the margin of monitoring allowed by art. 20 ET, has proceeded to install cameras for 
video recording, there would be fewer areas of conflict between criminal and social jurisdiction and it would 
contribute to the formation of a coherent thesis around the limitability of fundamental rights. 
In this way, any evidence found "by chance" (or "in good faith") by an employer who installed video 
surveillance cameras for the ordinary monitoring of compliance in workplace relations, in accordance with the 
requirements of the regulations in force, should be perfectly admissible and, consequently, should be able to 
uphold a conviction or sanctions according to the case. 
This is based on the argument that, in the first place, it is evidence obtained by an individual – however much 
the employer/employee relationship is not ruled by the equality of position normally present in this type of 
relationship; and, secondly, it is evidence obtained "by chance" (or "in good faith"), in the sense that the 
purpose of the recording was not to obtain evidentiary sources for court proceedings. In this regard, it should 
be recalled that the obligation to inform workers about the recordings is the responsibility of the employer 
This interpretation would allow us to evaluate the evidence referred to earlier – rejected by the TS – of the 
cashier in the supermarket who passed items without scanning them, handing them to her boyfriend (STS of 
13 May 2014), and that of the theft carried out by a worker in an office that had likewise had a video 
surveillance camera installed (STS 239/2014, of 1 April)44. Acceptance of this theory could result in acceptance 
of the evaluation of evidence in both social and criminal proceedings, with the consequent unification of 
doctrine on the interpretation of prohibited evidence. 
4. International Data Transfers: International Flow of Data vs. Protection of the Owner of the Data  
4.1. Technological advances – in particular, the development of the Internet – greatly facilitate the processing 
and exchange of information, allowing us to share technological resources, centralise certain activities and 
processes, and lower costs involved in the delivery of services by companies, outside of the country in which 
they are based. These advances mean personal data, always of interest and useful for the development of any 
large scale activity, can today circulate internationally very quickly and be stored indefinitely. 
International transfers of personal data, in areas such as human resources, financial services, education, e-
commerce and research in the area of health, have become an integral and integrating part of the globalised 
economy. Indeed, the international flow of personal data is not only an auxiliary industry with regard to 
companies, institutions and people engaged in performing or using bank transfers, reservations of airline 
tickets or international legal assistance, but is a growing economic sector in itself. 
It is undeniable that the qualitative and quantitative transformation in the international flows of personal 
data has increased the efficiency of companies and has contributed to the deve lopment of the 
Information Society and the globalisation of economic activity. But such contributions have not come 
without costs, since the privacy of the owner of such data has been put in jeopardy. It is also clear that, 
without too much technical difficulty, information can be the subject of unlawful processing; in other 
words, an international transfer of personal data without the consent of the person concerned, 
concluding in a violation of their fundamental, constitutionally protected rights.  
The purpose of data protection is to provide the owner of the data with adequate and effective defence 
mechanisms against the unlawful acquisition or processing of personal information. This is achieved 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
end the purpose of the photos is that they serve as evidence." VELASCO NÚÑEZ, E., "Derecho a la imagen: tratamiento 
procesal penal" (Rights to the Image: Criminal Procedural Treatment), Diario La Ley, Nº 8595, 1 September de 2015, 
Ref. D-311. 
44 In this respect, the individual opinions issued by the Judge Antonio del Moral García in response to STS 569/2013, of 
26 June and 239/2014, of 1 April are particularly eloquent. 
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through a balancing act involving the allocation of rights to the owner of the data and the imposition of 
obligations on those that capture or process the data, and/or exercise control over its processing. Finding 
solutions that satisfy the legitimate interests of all parties involved in international data transfer s is not 
easy, particularly due to the clear differences existing between the different levels of protection of the 
rights and freedoms of individuals and their privacy. 
The differences found in the protection provided by the relevant provisions of the various regulations are 
susceptible to both hindering the free transfer of data and to circumventing its correct handling: if the 
processing regime is more burdensome in one country than in another, this may encourage the development 
of business strategies or a change in location in an attempt to avoid the application of high standards of 
protection. 
The undeniable international nature of the relationships involved in a transfer of personal data creates a fertile 
ground for the emergence of problems that are the subject of study on the part of private international law. 
On the one hand, the vast majority of personal data processing operations are presupposed to have cross-
border implications. For example, those relating to the provision of processing services that businesses agree 
between each other – already involving the assignment or communication of data between those responsible, 
or access to them by a manager or delegated person – where there is a presence of one or more foreign 
elements, can become international. This would be the case where the professionals involved are located in 
different states, either because the data itself moves from one state to another, or from a protected territory 
to a third state. On the other hand, beyond the undeniable multidisciplinary nature of the issue, international 
transfers of data are susceptible to causing multiple private legal relationships, both contractual and extra-
contractual. 
The potential plurality of legal systems involved in the safeguarding of the correct international 
movement of personal data and the existence of international transfers of such data,  a result of the 
increasing international nature of personal and commercial relationship, requires the intervention of 
private international law – but not just any intervention. Rather it is necessary to explore the virtues of the 
system when dealing with a specific legal problem in order to achieve proper, balanced and effective 
safeguards for anyone harmed by the unlawful processing of personal data, derived from an international 
transfer. 
And all this must be done within a new normative context: Regulation (EU) No. 2016/679 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 relating to the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, which repeals Directive 95/46/EC  
(General Rules of Data Protection). 
4.2. The proliferation of state courts with jurisdiction in cases involving a multitude of countries hinders the 
much-needed legal security in international private traffic and means that the harmful effects of a wrongful act 
may emerge in every country in the world from where it is possible to access the injurious information (the 
personal data of the affected party). The plurality of judicial forums that are provided by different regimes of 
international jurisdiction favours so-called forum shopping on the part of the subject affected, who may 
choose to file a lawsuit before those courts whose rules of conflict apply a law that provides for a regime of 
non-contractual liability that is more favourable to their own interests. 
The current rules of international jurisdiction are not only clearly inadequate to protect the victim of the 
unlawful international processing of their data, but they can even lead to counterproductive results. 
Firstly, the judicial remedy of free will is dangerous in a situation involving imbalance between the parties, 
as evidenced by the existence of forums for protection under the various systems of private international 
law. The possibility of an implied jurisdiction is difficult to verify in practice: firstly, because the vict im will 
have a logical tendency to sue in the courts of their place of residence; secondly, because it seems clear  
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that the causer of the damage, rather than submit to such courts, would challenge their jurisdiction, to 
avoid being tried by the courts of the counterparty. 
As to the determination of applicable law, insofar as Article 1.2.g of the current "Rome II" Regulation 
establishes that "this Regulation will exclude from the scope of application, the area of: [...] g) non-contractual 
obligations arising out of the breach of privacy or rights related to the personality; in particular, defamation", 
the solution will involve resorting to article 10.9 of Spain's Civil Code, which takes locus delicti commissi as its 
point of connection; that is to say, the application of "the law of the place where the delict [tort] was 
committed" (lex loci delicti commissi), which could mean a choice between the law of the place where the 
personal data was collected or that of the state where such personal information was processed, must be 
presided over by favor laesi, in order to guarantee that the injured party receives adequate, balanced and 
effective protection. 
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